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RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
A cognitive forcing tool to mitigate
cognitive bias – a randomised control trial
Eoin D. O’Sullivan1* and Susie J. Schofield2
Abstract
Background: Cognitive bias is an important source of diagnostic error yet is a challenging area to understand and
teach. Our aim was to determine whether a cognitive forcing tool can reduce the rates of error in clinical decision
making. A secondary objective was to understand the process by which this effect might occur.
Methods: We hypothesised that using a cognitive forcing tool would reduce diagnostic error rates. To test this
hypothesis, a novel online case-based approach was used to conduct a single blinded randomized clinical trial
conducted from January 2017 to September 2018. In addition, a qualitative series of “think aloud” interviews were
conducted with 20 doctors from a UK teaching hospital in 2018. The primary outcome was the diagnostic error rate
when solving bias inducing clinical vignettes. A volunteer sample of medical professionals from across the UK,
Republic of Ireland and North America. They ranged in seniority from medical student to Attending Physician.
Results: Seventy six participants were included in the study. The data showed doctors of all grades routinely made errors
related to cognitive bias. There was no difference in error rates between groups (mean 2.8 cases correct in intervention vs
3.1 in control group, 95% CI -0.94 – 0.45 P = 0.49). The qualitative protocol revealed that the cognitive forcing strategy was
well received and a produced a subjectively positive impact on doctors’ accuracy and thoughtfulness in clinical cases.
Conclusions: The quantitative data failed to show an improvement in accuracy despite a positive qualitative experience.
There is insufficient evidence to recommend this tool in clinical practice, however the qualitative data suggests such an
approach has some merit and face validity to users.
Keywords: Cognitive bias, Heuristics, Clinical error, Decision making
Background
The term “cognitive bias” describes a variety of uncon-
scious influences, short-cuts and behaviours which influ-
ence our decision making. Cognitive bias is increasingly
recognised as an important cause of medical error. Cog-
nitive factors are estimated to contribute to up to 75% of
errors in internal medicine and errors in cognition have
been identified in all steps of the diagnostic process in-
cluding information gathering, association triggering,
context formulation, processing, and verification [1, 2].
Supporting this, a retrospective cohort analysis of errors
at a veteran’s affairs facility suggested at least 13% of
diagnostic errors relate to interpretation of test results
and 78.9% involve the patient encounter [3]. Indeed,
when doctors are asked to reflect on their own errors,
cognitive error is thought to be responsible for up to
30% of self-reported diagnostic errors in the emergency
department and 42% in internal medicine [4, 5].
Despite this growing recognition of cognitive error, it
has proven a challenging area to research for a variety of
reasons, including a lack of high quality data on preva-
lence, a lack of granularity when data are present and
difficulty recording or observing a sometimes nebulous
and intangible internal process [6–9]. Graber et al. have
complied a review of potential interventions designed to
reduce overall diagnostic error, a subgroup of which in-
cludes cognitive bias [10]. A recent review concludes
that the majority of debiasing interventions are at least
partially successful, although only 13 studies were tar-
geted at health care professionals, and the methodo-
logical quality was highly variable [11]. Debiasing is a
rapidly growing area of research and over 40 potential
mitigation strategies have been identified and explored
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in recent publications. Understanding how and when to
deploy a debiasing strategy, and measuring its effect re-
mains challenging [12]. This is the important gap in the
evidence we wished to address with our research. Our
aim was to design and test a debiasing strategy in
clinicians.
Characteristics of an ideal debiasing strategy are efficacy,
ease of deployment, and specificity to the task at hand.
After reviewing the literature for previous efforts to debias
clinicians, and considering our desired characteristics, we
decided a simple mnemonic would be an ideal debiasing
tool. To assess our tool, we conducted a randomised con-
trolled trial of its use during clinical cases by clinicians. To
improve our understanding of the tool, an additional
qualitative approach using a think-aloud protocol was
used.
While lists have been generated of likely biases within
medicine, it is unknown as to which biases are the most
statistically common, the most clinically impactful and
would thus result in the highest yield if targeted by a
successful intervention [13]. Previous research has not
been directed at the most common biases, but usually at
a convenience sample of easily investigated biases. We
thought it important to design our cognitive interven-
tion and cases specifically towards the most common
biases reported in the literature, to maximise any poten-
tial value such an intervention would have. Those biases
that have been reported experimentally or observation-
ally in the literature are described in Additional file 1,
and these informed both our forcing strategy and clinical
cases. While many other biases undoubtedly exist, we
felt designing our cases and interventions in such a way
was most in keeping with the philosophy of
evidence-based medicine.
Methods
The mnemonic “SLOW” was created as our interven-
tion. The word “slow” itself is an important reminder to
slow down, an evidenced based method of improving
diagnostic accuracy [14–18]. In addition to this, each let-
ter is a prompt, which is chosen to counteract a specific
bias. Each specific prompt is designed to act as a meta-
cognitive trigger, drawing from the existing evidence of
individually successful interventions and combining
these into a single tool. It is possible a single metacogni-
tive trigger may have an effect on multiple forms of bias.
The “SLOW” intervention presented to students and
doctors is shown in Fig. 1. Table 1 summarises the spe-
cific biases that have been shown to improve with each
trigger used, as well as the evidence for this.
Qualitative methods
In order to create some understanding of how the
SLOW tool might have an effect, an additional qualita-
tive approach was employed. Subjects recruited to the
qualitative study were an additional convenience sample
of students and doctors within the Royal Infirmary of
Edinburgh, UK.
A thematic analysis of the qualitative data was per-
formed. Volunteers were given the case scenarios to
consider and asked to answer questions that followed.
The first 25% of volunteers were used as a control group
to establish common themes and define some of the
cognitive missteps that occur as they moved towards the
bias. The following 75% were then introduced to the
cognitive forcing tool and asked to use the tool when an-
swering the questions.
Data were gathered using a concurrent think-aloud
protocol, the interviews were recorded and stored
Fig. 1 The “SLOW” cognitive forcing tool as displayed to participants
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digitally. The think aloud protocols were then tran-
scribed verbatim. After data reduction, open-coding was
performed on all transcripts where thought processes,
key concepts and biases were coded and quantitatively
analysed.
Ten cases were designed to trigger a specific bias. Each
case is a short clinical scenario with subsequent ques-
tions. To hide the potential biases from candidates and
emulate the real-world nature of diagnostic error, atten-
tion diverting information and distractors were used
when necessary. Two pilot studies were performed to
ensure the cases triggered bias and to ensure clarity and
content validity. The biases covered include the repre-
sentative bias, conjunction fallacy, overconfidence, base
rate neglect, diagnostic momentum, ascertainment bias,
the framing effect, conjunction rule and availability bias.
The authors were satisfied that participants in these pilot
studies understood the questions being asked and were
considering the questions as intended. Full cases can be
found in Additional file 2.
Quantitative methods
The SLOW intervention was tested as a randomised
control trial delivered via an online application. A do-
main was registered, and the cases (Additional file 2)
were presented to candidates who followed a shared
hyperlink. After reviewing a consent form, each volun-
teer was randomised by the application to either an
intervention or control group in a 50:50 ratio using a
random number generator at the time of participation.
To be eligible to participate, volunteers were required to
be medical professionals of any seniority or discipline, or
medical students. The active group was given a brief pri-
mer on the SLOW mnemonic and how to use it. Follow-
ing each case, the subjects were subsequently asked to
complete an onscreen checklist prompted by the
“SLOW” tool. This checklist was implemented to force
the clinician to consider each specific cognitive element
before they could proceed to the following question. A
timer was visible on screen counting upwards to induce
a sense of urgency and time pressure, although no time
limit was placed on the cases. The second group acted
as a control group and solved the same cases but with-
out the SLOW prompt.
These two groups were then compared under the hy-
pothesis that the SLOW forcing tool would increase the
number of correct answers in the intervention arm.
Recruitment
Subjects recruited included senior medical students, jun-
ior doctors and consultants. Participants were recruited
locally in Edinburgh via the medical school and local
mailing lists. University College Cork, Ireland and Uni-
versity of Dundee, UK assisted in recruitment of further
undergraduates. Social media was also used as a recruit-
ment tool to recruit post graduate doctors, including
posting on medical Facebook groups, instant messaging
groups, and Twitter.
Outcomes
The primary outcomes were the number of correct an-
swers in the intervention group as compared to control
group.
Secondary outcomes include comparing the effect of
any clinical seniority, age or time taken on error rates.
We also examined the error rates of each question indi-
vidually to assess any effect of the intervention on spe-
cific biases or scenarios.
Statistical analysis
Calculating a sample size when the estimated effect size
is unknown is challenging. Based on our pilot studies we
anticipated a mean correct response of 50% + − 10%. We
estimated that the SLOW tool would deliver an increase
of 10%. Thus, a statistical effect size of this magnitude
required approximately 168 students in total to have a
90% chance of detecting an effect as significant at the
5% level.
The free text answers to questions were coded into
nominal (binary) variables for analysis. Continuous vari-
ables are expressed as means and standard deviations.
Chi-squared and independent students t-tests were used
for comparison of nominal and continuous data
respectively.
All statistics were performed in SPSS version 20. All p
values are two-sided at a 0.05 significance level. During
the analysis of the trial results, the investigators were
blinded to the group type during analysis.
Ethics and data management
Ethical approval was gained via University of Dundee
Research Ethics committee. All data were stored an-
onymously under 256-bit AES encryption on a single
solid-state hard drive in a secure location. The British
Educational Research Association ethical guidelines were
considered during study design and adhered to through
this research [19].
Table 1 The biases addressed by the SLOW tool
Intervention Bias addressed Reference
Slowing Down Availability, multiple [14–18, 24–26]
S – Sure? Overconfidence, hindsight [27–29]
L – Look /Lacking/Link Multiple [30]
O – Opposite Anchoring [31–33]
W – Worst case Scenario Search satisfying [30]
O’Sullivan and Schofield BMC Medical Education           (2019) 19:12 Page 3 of 8
Results
Qualitative results
The aim of the qualitative analysis was to try to under-
stand common trends that lead to incorrect answers.
This could potentially inform us as to “why” people were
making cognitive mistakes. Our qualitative analysis in-
cluded even numbers of men (n = 10; 50%) and women
(n = 10; 50%), and included 5 students, 3 first year grad-
uates, and the remainder were varying degrees of senior-
ity between 2 and 10 years post-graduation. Data were
gathered using the “think aloud” protocol, and were then
assessed for quality [20]. Each interview was assessed to
ensure it was of high enough quality to interpret. Once
common themes became apparent for each case, further
cases were used to illuminate differences in findings, and
once the same themes were emerging, it was felt that
saturation of the data had occurred which added face
validity to the findings.
The most striking aspect of the data is the prevalence
of error. Even experienced clinicians were prone to the
same errors students made. This suggests to the authors
that bias may only be partially compensated for by clin-
ical experience. Subjects rarely changed their minds
once they had answered a question – as change of mind
was slightly more common when using the SLOW tool
and they were forced to reconsider data. There was a
tendency to immediately frame the problem as soon as a
pattern was recognised (e.g. “This is a situation of drug
seeking behaviour” in the case of hidden infection or
“this is a question about statistics isn’t it?” during a case
demonstrating drug marketing techniques). This initial
framing informed how the remaining information was
processed. When this initial framing was incorrect, it in-
variably lead to error. Using the SLOW tool helped
many candidates return to the beginning and purposely
reframe the question, which often lead to improvements.
“Considering the Opposite” was also a powerful tech-
nique and many subjects who had provided incorrect
answers or made errors, reconsidered and “safety netted”
following the SLOW tool. While this didn’t necessarily
increase their initial diagnostic accuracy, the clinical
plans were safer and less likely to result in downstream
error.
Detailed case by case analysis is provided in
Additional file 3.
Quantitative results
We recruited 300 medical professionals from a number
of centres from across the UK, Republic of Ireland and
North America (locations not recorded to maintain ano-
nymity but noted through feedback to the investigators)
from January 2017 to September 2018. Following data
cleaning 244 responses were felt to be insufficient or in-
complete, leaving 76 participants of sufficient quality for
analysis. Most of excluded cases answered 1 or 2 ques-
tions initially before quitting the application and these
have not been included in further analysis. This gives a
“drop-out” rate of 74.6%. Table 2 shows the characteris-
tics of our candidates.
Primary outcome
The primary outcome the number of correct responses
to the cases. The intervention group had a mean of 2.8
correct answers compared to a mean of 3.1 correct an-
swers in the control group. This difference was not clin-
ically or statistically significant (P = .49, 95% CI -0.94 –
0.45).
Secondary outcomes
Overall error rate of cases
The overall error rates are shown in Table 3. Error rate
is the number of respondents who incorrectly answered
the question. Our subjective impression based on the
qualitative data that a large percentage of these errors
are driven by the cognitive bias embedded into the ques-
tion as designed. Qualitative interviews suggest that case
8 is probably not adequate to detect conjunction bias,
but it is included for completeness. No difference was
detected in error rates based on clinical grade or age
range.
Impact of intervention on individual cases
The “correct answer” response rates are summarised in
Table 4. No difference was detected between the inter-
vention and control group.
Time taken
Time taken to complete each case was measured in sec-
onds. Total time taken was 1472 ± 437 in the interven-
tion group as compared to 1359 ± 403 in the control
group (P = 0.37). Students-Test test failed to show any
significant difference in the mean seconds taken to
complete the individual cases between the intervention
group and control group. No significant between group
Table 2 Characteristics of candidates
Intervention(n = 37) Control(n = 37)
Level of Training
Student 0 2
Junior 11 13
Middle Grade 24 17
Senior 2 5
Age (years)
18–25 11 12
26–34 21 20
35+ 5 5
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differences were found for any of the candidate
characteristics.
Discussion
Overall the results of our research are thought provoking.
The findings of the qualitative think aloud protocols dem-
onstrate that subjective quality of thought and problem
solving improved with usage of the cognitive forcing tool.
The qualitative insight gained into the potential role of
a debiasing tool is valuable. The participants feedback
(Additional file 3) suggests the tool was successful in
achieving its goal in helping users slow down and avoid
bias. Furthermore, the SLOW intervention was more
successful in some cases than others, being more useful
in the case of “confirmation bias” but noticeably less
useful in statistical bias for example. This is broadly en-
couraging and suggests there is a role for such a tool,
but perhaps used in a more focused and refined manner.
These findings contrasted with the results of our trial
which failed to show any difference in quality of answers
by candidates using the intervention. There are a num-
ber of potential explanations for these discordant
findings.
The most important explanation to consider is simply
that the null hypothesis is true - that this intervention
does not have any measurable effect on cognitive bias.
The validity of such a statement however depends on
the quality of the trial and analysis. Unfortunately, the
recruited numbers were less than we hoped following
data cleaning. An initial 300 responses dwindled to 78
when data were cleaned and prepared for analyses. The
high attrition rate was due to incomplete answers, or
clear attempts to rapidly get through each case as
quickly as possible – as indicated by extremely short
time spent per questions and single word/nonsense an-
swers. Despite erring on the side of caution with a mod-
est effect size in our initial power calculations, we were
surprised by such a high rate of unusable data, and thus
our recruitment may have been still too low to detect a
difference between the groups.
A second potential explanation for the lack of differ-
ence between groups is limitations of the trial method-
ology. The cases themselves appear to have performed
well and served their purpose and triggered a high num-
ber of incorrect answers as seen in Table 3. The qualita-
tive conversations give some face validity to the notion
that it was the specific biases leading to incorrect an-
swers in each case, as per their design. However, it is in-
teresting to note that there was no difference in the time
taken between the intervention and the control group.
This would suggest that ironically, despite the carefully
considered name of the mnemonic, it failed to achieve at
least one of its primary goals, which was to make candi-
dates “slow down”. This leads us to wonder whether
candidates engaged with the intervention as expected, or
simply rapidly clicked through the options to progress to
the next stage.
It may be unwise to attribute all incorrect responses to
cognitive error, and some commentators argue that it is
a lack of factual knowledge that is most important [21].
This has been vigorously disputed, and we would argue
that our cases were designed so as not to need any ad-
vanced or complex knowledge to perform well [22].
We opted to use social media as a research platform
to increase geographical reach and recruitment, and thus
increased both generalisability of findings, and statistical
power. Certainly, participants spanned all grades from
student to consultant, and came from all over UK, the
Republic of Ireland, and North America. However, we
suspect that the anonymous, instantaneous and inpatient
online culture lead to the very high dropout rate- drop-
out increased as subjects progressed through the cases.
A further concern with using social media to recruit is
confirming that participants were indeed doctors. While
the channels used were specific to medical professionals,
it would be impossible to confirm this without collecting
identifiable information. While we are suggesting the
Table 3 Overall Error rates for each case
Case Bias Overall Error Rate
1 Representativeness 39 (52.7%)
2 Overconfidence 51 (68.9%)
3 Base Rate Neglect 73 (98.6%)
4 Confirmation Bias 42 (56.8%)
5 Search Satisfying 51 (68.9%)
6 Diagnostic Momentum 67 (90.5%)
7 The Framing Effect 56 (75.7%)
8 Conjunction Bias 66 (89.2%)
9 Framing Effect, Diagnostic Momentum 48 (64.9%)
10 Availability Bias 24 (32.4%)
Table 4 Correct Response to Cases
Intervention Control
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Sig.
Case 1 19 (51) 20 (54) .816
Case 2 9 (24) 14 (38) .209
Case 3 0 1 (3) .555
Case 4 17 (46) 14 (38) .434
Case 5 14 (38) 9 (24) .209
Case 6 4 (11) 3 (8) .691
Case 7 6 (16) 12 (33) .104
Case 8 2 (5) 6 (16) .134
Case 9 11 (20) 15 (41) .330
Case 10 24 (65) 26 (70) .619
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trial data do not align entirely with the subjective assess-
ments of our think aloud protocol, we are aware of the
fact such qualitative data cannot provide objective evi-
dence of efficacy. We are thus aware of the ironic risk of
our own confirmation bias that might tempt us to “ex-
plain away” the trial shortcomings.
Limitations of the “think aloud” protocol are that in
making inner speech external, there is an implicit simpli-
fication of abstract and complex thoughts, often before
the speaker themselves can fully understand what they
are about to say. It is unclear to psychological re-
searchers, how much this vocalisation changes the
thought itself as it is being verbalised. Ericson reasoned
the goal of a think out loud protocol was to give access
to the ‘working memory’ used when problem solving.
This might pose potential issues however, such as only
information that is noticed by the subject will be entered
into working memory and thus be spoken. The limited
capacity of working memory means that only words that
immediately follow the thoughts represent what is cur-
rently happening in the working memory and taking too
long to vocalise might result in newer thoughts replacing
the original ones. These are thoughts which may never
be captured if spontaneous speech is delayed. A second
issue arises when considering think aloud protocols in
the context of dual process thinking. System 1 is a
non-verbal system, and probably the more bias prone
system, as discussed. The act of verbalising a thought
however, moves the problem to system 2. Given that sys-
tem 2 is thought to have a greater capacity to recognise
and overcome bias, this may obscure the true extent of
bias in our subjects, and perhaps also explain the dis-
crepancy between the benefits in the think aloud proto-
col as compared to the trial. Finally, there may be
‘intermediate’ or automatic processes, thoughts and con-
nections which occur quickly in working memory which
may be “unconscious” and might not be amenable to be-
ing captured by speech. Interpreting the thinking out
loud data requires a degree of inference, based on inter-
pretation of the subject’s tone, body language and nu-
ances of the language (e.g. repetition of works when
searching for meaning). This was an important add-
itional necessity in data interpretation beyond simply
reading through the text, as much meaning may be lost
with a purely quantitative approach. Such an approach
raises the issue of researcher subjectivity. Is was import-
ant to reflect upon the degree to which the first author
was an “insider researcher” here, and the potentially
confounding influence of this relationship [23].
The researcher in such a situation will always have
some impact on a subject, so our pragmatic approach
was to acknowledge, reflect on and attempt to mitigate
this. We endeavoured to ignore any pre-existing know-
ledge of the subjects in ours mind, and continually
challenged ourselves by questioning the impartiality of
any assessments made. There may be some value in the
position of an insider researcher during a think aloud
protocol however – We felt that knowing some subjects
for many years granted a very immediate and intimate
understanding of their language choice and speech pat-
terns and allowed us to identify their thoughts and sub-
sequently their biases more readily. This was an
advantage in some cases, and perhaps a think aloud
protocol benefits from this insider phenomenon to an
extent. Finally, one might also argue that in an era of
pragmatic clinic trials, where researchers attempt to cre-
ate as clinically relevant and realistic a trial as possible,
failure to engage with an intervention in the comfort of
their own homes /office may be a sign that doctors
would not use such a tool on a busy ward.
Cognitive Biases can be deep seated and entrenched
elements of our cognition, and it is likely that they ex-
hibit heterogenous characteristics, having been estab-
lished through a multitude of routes [12]. Thus, it is
likely that a range of de-biasing strategies and regimes
might be required- there is unlikely to a singular perfect
solution. For example, our study was a single snapshot
in time of bias post our intervention. It may however be
important that such an intervention is repeated to im-
prove or maintain its debiasing effect.
Conclusion
Cognitive bias remains an important contributing factor
to medical errors and at least some common bias can be
reproduced in a written case-based format as we have
done. When assessed using thinking aloud interviews,
using a cognitive forcing strategy improved the subject-
ive quality of thought and problem solving. These find-
ings were not supported in a randomised controlled trial
setting. Issues surrounding engagement with the inter-
vention make it difficult to conclusively say whether this
was a truly negative trial, or rather an unsuccessful trial
design/delivery. We did not find sufficient evidence to
support to use of this specific tool in routine clinical or
education practice. Future researchers could learn from
our experiences by ensuring that any interventions are
deployed directly into clinical practice for a more prag-
matic trial design which would allow them to bypass our
concerns over engagement when not directly observed.
What they would lose in potential subject number, they
would gain in higher quality of data, and a directly ob-
served intervention would allow them to assess real life
engagement and clinical utility.
Cognitive bias remains an important area of future re-
search, and we hope our results can perhaps guide
others in designing their studies and tools to help the
modern doctor navigate an increasingly complex world
of clinical problems.
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